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The use in this paper of the terms race and class has proceeded
on the assumption that the historian is absolved from the
obligation to contribute anything noteworthy about their meanings
as concepts. To do that is the province of the sociologist or
the economist. No doubt some social scientists would object to
a particular historian's method of testing the usefulness of these
concepts as techniques of historical explanation. To the historian
that is quite acceptable as fair criticism, provided that he is
not saddled with the duty of redefining them as concepts. Another
difficulty lies in the fact that many historians, including myself,
in terms of our temperament and approach, do not find historical
explanation involving the use of large categories of this kind very
satisfying. We are more interested in the particular, in specific
events and in the actions of specific people. At the same time
historians must accept that the social scientists are correct to
stress the dimension of the impersonal in attempting to explain
social change. When the role of impersonal categories In the past
is at issue, the historian has a claim to be heard. For if the
historian's grasp of the models and concepts of the social sciences
is shaky, perhaps as imperfect is',the concrete historical knowledge
of many social scientists.
The historian's characteristic approach would/require him to embark
on the basis of a precise definition or a firm theory of race aid class.
Presumably it can be accepted that race has a scientific basis in
genetics, as a means of classifying mankind according to certain
physical differences of a hereditary nature. The main controversies
about race arise from attempts to explain certain culturally based
behaviour patterns in terms of these racial differences, and as a
consequence of this to rank races on a superior-inferior scale. The
validity of race as a category of explanation does not require the
adoption/*..
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adoption of a particular position in these controversies.
Obviously 'racism1, in the sense of racial consciousness, is and
has been a factor in many societies, and as such it forms a
legitimate object of study. Admittedly this does not validate
race as a category of explanation. At the same time the
potential validity of race as such a category should not simply
be rejected a priori. To insist that race must always be :
explained away in terms of something else is to indulge in 'the
counter fallacy of anti-racism j which may be just as wrong-headed
as racism itself. It is a contention of this paper that some of
the analyses of recent South African history in social terms _
reflect a tendency to reject out of hand explanations in terms of
race, on the mistaken ground that such explanations are themselves
instances of the racist fallacy.
As far as class is concerned, the historian's problem lies in the
bewildering variety of senses in which the concept is used by social
scientists. On the criterion of classifying individuals on the
basis of their occupations, it might be possible to delineate
social classes in a more or less objective way. Alternatively the
criterion might be invoked of class consciousness on the part of
the individuals, which would call for evidence of their own f
subjective assessment of their class affiliation. In both these
cases class is used as a more or less permanent attribute applying
to a collection of individuals. Newer insights in sociology and
social anthropology are evidently leading to quite a different
conception of class, not as a grouping of individuals but as a
network of social relations that are constantly subject to change.
Presumably the classification in social anthropological studies of
Africans in dual roles, as townsmen as well as tribesmen, is an
instance of this tendency. Stimulating as these rival concepts of
class/...
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class may be, their very variety must create a doubt in the
historian's mind as to the claims of analysis in terms of
social class to override all other categories of explanation.
The reference to the 20th century in the title of this paper
does not mean that the analysis is meant to be applicable to
the present situation in South Africa. It is in fact a
historical analysis beginning with Union in 1910 and ending
for the most part in 1948. It does not seek to enter the
controversy as to whether the differences between pre-1948
segregation and post-1948 apartheid are qualitative or not.
On the other hand it does assume certain continuities between
the present and the recent past, and the prevalence of
features fundamental to South African society both then and
now. What follows next is an analysis of race relations in
South Africa in terms of a power balance between the ruling
whites and the subject races. The paper then proceeds to a
discussion of class formation and class conflicts in early
. . industrial South Africa, but reaches the conclusion that race
{ •
has been a more decisive factor* Finally it seeks to assess
some recent attempts to reassert the claim that class conflict
is, after all, the decisive consideration, and that race
relations themselves are properly to be explained in class
terms.
The/...
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The racial basis of the modern South African state is a truism.
There uas unite supremacy everywhere in South Africa before 1910
but Union formalised and intensified it. Lord Selborne, the
British high commissioner at the time, had warned that 'the worst
form of government for natives is direct government by a
Parliament of white men,'1 ' Yet this is what Union entailed. It
mads possible the exercise by the white electorate, through the
institutions of parliamentary democracy, of the right of self-
determination. It also meant, in a way that was not fully
recognised at the time, the grasp by the white minority of political
domination over all other groups in a plural society. If we think
of this arrangement as a form of colonial rule, there was nothing
very remarkable about it. Nearly all Africa uas under colonial
rule. The only difference in the South African case uas that the
ruling whites lived in the same country as their black 'subjects', f~
instead of being based in a metropolitan or colonising country in
Europe. It was a]most universally assumed that all the colonial
powers in Africa, including the Union, were committed to the task
of trusteeship. This approach Implied a paternalist policy,
conceivably in perpetuity, for it was still widely accepted that
the wards, the black people who were being ruled, were racially
inferior. Even a paternalist policy uas meant to show progress of
a kind, though not necessarily political advancement• In the
South African case the vague ideal uas that the ruling white
minority should raise the backward African majority in the scale
of civilisation. There were no Immediate pressures on the whites
as to what course they should embark on in fulfilling this
obligation. v
Since it uas the whites who made up the political nation, enjoying
t.hH offective power, the tone of South African politics uas
initially set in terms of issues dividing the whits community*
There were elements of a revival of the old Anglo-Boer 'racial'
conflict but politics was mainly 'a debate among Afrikaners about
(2 )
what to do about the British.'v ' The issues were the familiar
onest 'South Africa first* as against imperial interests,
language equality, the move towards Dominion autonomy and the
demand for a republic. It was in this context that Afrikaner
nationalism/...
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nationalism emerged as the political pacemaker and, after
assuming full and long term pouer in 1948, finally achieved its
republican goal in 1961,
The dominance of issues in white politics in the generation
after Union uas underlined by the impression among politicians
that black-uhite questions uere simply less pressing* This is
not to imply that issues in white politics operated on an
independent plane, without reference to the other set of questions
relating to multi-racial South Africa. Many issues in white
politics had their plural aide. About immigration, for example,
the Afrikaner fear and the English hope was that it would one
day give the English section an electoral majority* But from a
white standpoint immigration could also mean an improvement in
the ratio of white to black. Until 1961 It uas the Afrikaner
(3)fear that prevailed. ' Issues of race relations uere capable
of /breaking more directly into the preserve of white politics.
Frequently the political parties made a straightforward appeal
to the racial interests and fears of the white electorate; This
first happened in the 1924 general election when the Nationalist-
Labour pact exploited the issue of the industrial colour bar* In
the 'black Manifesto1election of 1929, when Smuts uas accused of
endangering white interests by his defence of the Cape franch!ae
•for Africans and his suggestion that the Union form part of a
British-created black federation to the north, the Nationalists
made the racial Issue the key one. The exercise uas repeated in
the apartheid campaign of 1948, On each occasion the device of
exploiting racial susceptibilities produced handsome electoral
gains.
At other times, Instead of outbidding each other, the white
parties appeared to be seeking consensus on racial issues. Both
the administrative experts In »Native Affairs1 and the politicians
preached the wisdom of keeping such matters outside party politics,
In part this uas a function of the avowed objective of building
a united white nation which, strong in its unity, would deal
justly and generously uith other groups. Nowhere, it seemed,
could the need for united action on the part of whites be stressed
more/...
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more than in the central area of their relations uith other
r aces•
It is hard to say whether it uas division among the whites or
consensus that proved more disadvantageous for the non-uhitea.
Smuts, under attack from both opposition parties for not taking
segregation far enough in his Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923,
surrendered to their insistence that there should be no guaranteed
freehold or other security of tenure for Africans in the towns.* '
On. the other hand consensus uas at a peak, during the fusion
government, when the Cape Africans lost their voting rights in
1 9 3 6 . . ' • . ' • • • - • •
The fact of white dominance In the Union did not mean political
quiescence on the part of non-whites. The most obvious resource r
open to Africans and Coloureds was provided by the survival of
the non-racial Cape franchise after Union. In the Cape the
importance of the Coloured and African vote to the two parties
in competition for It, as much as the liberal tradition, had
served to safeguard the franchise. Under Union a drastic
dilution'of the strength of non-white voters took place, through
the addition of the white voters from the other provinces. Later
the legislation of 1930-1931 took the dilution further, through
the enfranchisement of white women (thus excluding in the Cape
women of other races) and the exemption for white men In the Cape
from the need to meet the franchise qualifications. This
political weakness of non-white voting power, as well as the
inadequacy of the entrenchment given to the Cape franchise, v
facilitated the abolition first of the African common roll vote
in 1936 and twenty years later that of the Coloursds*
It cannot be claimed for the Cape franchise that it was an
effective weapon for the non-whites who obtained it* At no time
was there co-operation between Coloured and African leaders over
the use to which the votes of their followers were to be put.
Neither Dr. Abdurahman's African Political Organisation nor the
various African voters1 associations of the Eastern Cape were
able to co-ordinate Coloured and African voting behaviour, even
on separate lines* Tor as long as the non-racial franchise
survived/.•.
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survived, both the African and the Coloured vote functioned as
mere, appendages to the white political parties.
The .non-white political associations and pressure groups that
emerged in the post-Union period,were necessarily extra-parliamentary
in their, roles.. They were weak and divided structures giving
, - expression to African,. Coloured and Indian 'voice*1 rather than
political actiyity in pursuit of attainable ends. ; THeir. weakness
owed something to general inertia, quiescence and a tendency to
accept authority on .the part of the communities concerned* Apart
fvrcm this passive •collaboration' on the part of the masses, there
uaaVmpre active -c.ol^ abp.r.ation by . others.^ *.aUtth as the officially
recognised,and salaried ctyief.s co-operating with white administrators
(/ in the reserves. On the other Hand the political.behaviour of the
Africans, aa ..reflected in these movements, shoued a contrast to the
standard 19th century pattern of tribal resistance against the
encroaching ,and disrupting frontier of colonial rule* Relative also
t'b. the real of Africa at least up to 1945, non-uhits political
activity in South. Africa re.ached a.high level of aophiatication and
arMjculati.O;n_. . O.eepXte the general failure; to mobilise mass
movements, there uee, among the. leaders and to some extent beyond
them, a definite stirring of political consciousness* However
ineffective they have proved, new. forms of resistance to white rule
were; Jieing tried*.. . .. .... , .... . . / .•-.'..-
The mos.t significant of the African organisations to. emerge soon
after Union was the Industrial .and\.Cqmme.rcial Union.* / Created in
"Gape. T-qun in. 19.19 by Clements Kadalie, from Nyasaland* the I.C.U.
".quickly spread and soon flourished' as something of a mass movement
i:h-the eastern Cap..e, By 1927, following the move of Its headquarters
to'Johannesburg and,the emergence of 'the .Natal branch, centred on
'^-Durban, under the Zulu, A.C.U. Champion, the I.C.U. claimed to have
100000 members. Then, at the very height .of its influence it began
to;-coll-adse. .Internal .dissension .was. evident in the expulsion of
* • • ' * • . - • -j - . • . . • ^
the Communists in 1926 and in the rivalry of Kadalie and Champion
aa^  leaders. .Direct repression by ,the state also played a part in
the downfall of the I.C.U. •
" Although/...
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Although the African National Qongr,BBS emerged in 1912 (uhen it
uas founded as the. South African Native National Congress), its
role uas insignificant until the passive resistance campaign of
the 1950's.*6' In the thirties African political activity uas at
a louer ebb than in the twenties. For a time after 1936 the
African nationalist leadership uas prepared to give a try to separate
(7)
representation and the Native Representative Council*
Oust as there uas no organisation that could claim to give unified
expression to. African views, so there uas no prospect of a uniteQ1
non-unite front, except for the congress movement of the 1950'S.
The Colpureds hoped in vain.that Hertzog's promises to them upuld
be kept and that they uould be integrated politically with the {
unites. The Indians kept to the pattern set by Gandhi of palling
in the. mediating pouer of the imperial government (and later the
United Nations) to achieve special treatment as a distinct
community. Apart from the group consciousness of the Coloured and
Indian communities, it is arguable that both shared a latent
interest uith the whites, in thst all threB were and are minority
groups, uhen considered alongside the Africans*
Whatever the progress read into their efforts, or the value
attached to their experience, the non-white organisations clearly
failed as movements of protest against white rule. Any advances
they made were more than matched by the dynamic power resources of ,
the uhite state. Black disarmament uas virtually complete before
1910, while the coercive agencies fcuilt up after Union, the police
and defence forces, uere kept firmly under uhite control. Even the
undRniably modest goals of the early African nationalists, uho as
late as 1936 were demanding little more tfian the extension of the
Cape franchise to the rest of the country, uere capable of arousing
fears and hardening attitudes among whites. This effect became
more pronounced uith the shift in the 1950's to anti-colonialist '
aims including majority rule. The result has been the repression-
of these movements under special legislation and coercive powers.
In/.••
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In the above survey race has been employed as a category for
explaining the pouer relationships within the South African
state. Recently a demand has groun up for the application of
social clasB as an alternative technique of analysis. In part
this has been an Ideological development reflecting the intertet
of Marxist theorists in producing an explanation in terma of the
'class struggle1, dore broadly the interest in claas invites, In
an open-minded way, greater utilisation of sociological, and
economic concepts particularly in the study of more recent history.(8
Certainly-the theme of economic change in 20th century South Africa
Implies spectacular developments In the composition of social
classes. Even cursory attention to the twin processes of Indus-
trialisation and urbanisation serves to establish this. The first
sau the rapid grouth of secondary industry, especially in the
period after tha Sacond World Uar, to tha point of challenging
the primacy of goldmining and agriculture in tha aconomy. Tha
second, bringing to the towns tha necessary labour forca, had
especially decisive effects for both Afrikaners (since most English-
speaking South Africans were already urbanised) and Africans, as
the following table showas* '
Urban populations as percentages of the total population
Unites
Africans
Coloureds
Indiana
1911
51,6
12,6
46
46
25
1921
55,8
12,5
45,8
30,9
24,7
1936
65,2
17,3
53,9
66,3
25,1
1946
74,5
23,7
60,9
71,3
38,4
1951
78,4
27,2
64,7
77,5
42,6
1960
83,6
31,8
68,3
63,2
47
In so far as this economic grouth expanded the 'capitalist*
classes it was the whites who were involved* The ranks of the
goldmining magnates were joined by the entrepreneurs of commerce
and secondary industry, the professional 'element in the middle
class similarly greu. The establishment of Iscor in 1928 marked
the emergence of a component of 'state capitalism1, also controlled
by/...
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by unites. Finally the expanding opportunities of the urban
market and the subsidies provided by the state encouraged more
progressive methods on the part of many farmers, so agriculture
as a unite enterprise became more 'capitalist' in character.
The original component of the white working class consisted of
the skilled workers, mainly British and Australian born, who made
nearly all the early craft unions the preserve of whites* Next
were the white mineworkers who sought to monopolise skilled and
semi-skilled jobs on the mines in terms of the white labour
principle (carried in the nines and Works Act of 1911) that the
relevant'certificates of competency' should be Issued only to
uhites. ' A further element was added by the urban migration
of members of the depressed and unskilled white class of the V
countryside, the bywoners on farms owned by other whites. Some
of these 'poor whites' who came to the Reef went to work on the
mines, where by the time of the Rand Revolt of 1922 Afrikaners
formed a majority of the white workers* Others were helped by
the enforcement of the 'civilised labour* policy in the late
192O's« In one form this meant that,certain jobs on state or
utility undertakings, such as the railways, were reserved for
them. In another it meant the pronouncement by a board appointed
under the Uage Act of a particular occupation as one meriting a
'civilised' wage, in which case the white employer preferred to
(12)
take on a white worker rather than anyone else. '. The economic
growth of the late twenties and thirties also contributed to the /
solution of the 'poor white problem', especially in its recent
phases this growth has also added to the stratification and
complexity of the white working class, but without altering Its
peculiarly privileged character.
Turning to class formation among the other races, we may begin by
noting that economic growth and education have promoted the
emergence of a small middle class* Impreasionistically one could
assert that this process has gone further in the Indian and
Coloured communities than among Africans, and that in the case
of Africans and Coloureds the business component has been
smaller/* *.
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smaller than the professional one. That urbanisation entailed
some move towards the emergence of an African middle class Is
evident in the ownership by some Africans of urban freehold
property, although government policy since 1948 has halted this
tendency»
On the reserves economic growth this century has entailed a
decline in the tribal or communal peasantry which, it is now
claimed, had actually improved its condition in the mid-19th
century. The main reason for the decline was the growing demand,
from mining, secondary industry and public undertakings such as
the railways, for migratory labour. On the one hand this meant
a dependence of agriculture in the reserves on remittances from
migratory workers; on the other the low wages characteristic of
such labour may be linked to the supplementary subsistence income
drawn from that agriculture. Through soil-erosion, over-stocking
and inadequate farming methods, this additional Income has almost
certainly fallen* The result has been an undermining of the
stability of the migratory labour 'system' and the likelihood of
increasing poverty in the reserves. The more recant demand,
since 1945 especially, of secondary industry for a more stable
and efficient work force has added a new and growing dimension to
the African working class. These are the permanently urbanised,
non-migratory workers living In the townships, a category
recently described by Dr. Ellen Hellmann as 'second and third
generation townsmen, ethnically inter-married and strangers to
(13)the homelands'. ' Obviously the demand for labour of this
kind has had the effect of further undermining the migratory
system,
The political importance of these class divisions can readily be
illustrated. In the case of the whites, there was a definite
clnos conflict between capital and labour, the mineowner8 against
the mineworkers, which culminated In the Rand Revolt of 1922,
This conflict over the colour bar in mine labour was won in the
short term by the Chamber of Mines through Smuts'8 suppression of
the Revolt, but ultimately by the mineworkers through the victory
of/...
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o.f^the Nationalist-Labour Pact in 1924. Apart from the
reinstatement of the industrial colour bar through the passage
of the nines and Uorks Amendment Act in 1926, unite labour
secured further gains through the inception of the 'civilised
labour' policy. ' The new security and privileges thus given
to uhite labour may have contributed to the decline of the Labour
party, uhose rise had been linked to its exploitation of the
grievances of white workers, skilled and unskilled.
It is possible that class analysis might illuminate aspects of
the emergence of Afrikaner nationalism. If we take Afrikaner
nationalist antipathy to the mineowners, condemned as •imperialists1
and' the embodiment of the * Hoggenheimer'. monster, as directed
against big business rather than capitalism as such, then a middle V
class component is readily identifiable. The cultural nationalists,
lawyers, teachers and ministers of religion turned out by
Stellenbosch can be seen as an Afrikaner middle class elite, to be
Joined in the tuenties and thirties by the economic protectionists
and the nucleus of Afrikaner entrepreneurs in business.
The difficulty lies in over-simplification. Insistence on a class
analysis of this kind serves to underplay other factors, such as
the survival of personal and regional loyalties. It also ignores
the fact that Afrikaner nationalists sought to use the cement of
a common language, culture, religion and social life to bind as
many Afrikaners together as possible. Class differences could not s
be accentuated, for nationalism had to embrace wealthy farmers as
uel1 as byuoners, business and professional men as well as mine*
uorkers and urban poor unites.
Class considerations can also be taken into account in an estimate
of the African political associations. The Zululand branch of
the I.C.U. included farm labourers and squatters, but the
organisation uas essentially a decentralised urban movement
embracing African uorkers of every type except those on the mines.
Given the small proportion of Africans who had been permanently
urbanised by 1930, and the obvious obstacles to the organisation
of/...
- 13 -
of migratory workers, the class basis of the I.C.U. uas very
precarious. In the case of the A.N.C. the social basis uas
middle class but the elements were similarly ueak t excluding
the chiefs, who may be regarded as a more conservative influence,
there were teachers, ministers of religion, and rather fewer
lawyers and doctors.
The class designation of Africans could operate in another way,
that of making them the victims of special disabilities* In
terms of the Stallard doctrine, which Is often held to express
the spirit behind the urban areas legislation affecting Africans,
only those 'willing ... to minister to the needs pf the. white
man1 were welcome in the towns.* ' Yet in terms of the
Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924, which excluded them from
the definition of •employee1, these-African workers were denied
the right to strike or, in effect, to form.trade unions of their
(16) . . .
o w n . v ' • : • .. . •-: . .
In mast analyses .of the South African social system, it is
conceded that race rather than class has been the decisive
(17)factor,v ' The class allegiance of people has seldom been ablo
to cut across or transcend racial barriers. This can best be
shown in the failure particularly of any working class solidarity
to develop across the colour line* From the outset, both In
,-. -'their trade unions and in the white labour policy of their party,
the white workers defined their class consciousness in racial terms.
A similar line was followed in the thinking of the early South
African socialists. Indeed the availability to employers of cheap
African labour was regarded as a special local grievance, something
over and above the standard grievances against the capitalist
system which they held in common with members of the working class
' in other countries. Added to this was their firm ballef, hardly
questioned in early 20th century Squth Africa, that African
workers were a breed apart, racial inferiors unworthy to be
(18 ) '
members of the working class.
The/.*.
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/Tha first notable challenqe to this outlook came from the small
knot of socialists who broke uith orthodox labour on the issue1;'
of pacifism during the first Uorld Uar. By the time they founded
thn South African Communist party in 1921, they hed adopted a
conception of the proletariat that included all non-white as well
as unite workers. They believed further that the class interests
of white and black workers were fundamentally harmonious, and
that the white workers were the only section of the working class
capable at that stage of revolutionary action. Hence their
support for the striking miners in 1922 and their subscription to
the slogan (which one of them, S.P, Bunting, confessed to
communists abroad was 'grotesque'): 'Workers of the Uorld, Tight
and Unite for a White South Africa, • •I19'
In the event the Rand Revolt destroyed such Illusions about
working class solidarity. As a tribute to the political power
they exercised through their votes, which helped bring the Pact
to power, the white workers obtsinad special privileges. In
effect they were subsidised into full membership of the ruling
white race. Since no race barrier distinguished them from other
whites, they enjoyed easy social mobility in the white community
as a whole. If, as we have seen, organised labour declined as
a political entity (outside the trade unions), this was partly
because the party prop was no longer necessary.
As in the case of the working class, so was the small middle-class
emerging in each non-white community unable to form part of a
larger, non-racial middle class In which the whites would hava
been dominant. Nor was there one, self-conscious, non-uhite
middle class, but only middle class members of each of the three
distinct and internally divided non-white communities. As late aa
the forties, the chief aspiration of these middle class elements
seems to have been to acquire for themselves some title to enter
•civilised' (whits) society at certain levels. The characteristic
reply was given by Smuts in his Rhodes flemorial Lecture in 1929:
'the proper place of the educated minority of the natives is with
the rest of their people, of whom they are the natural leaders
and from whom they should not in any way be disassociated.
In the twenties and thirties there amerged the Joint council
C
dars,
.(20)
movement/*••
- 15 -
movement, in which in several centres white liberals co-operated
with educated Africans in defence of the Cape franchise, end also
in the hope of curbing communist and other extremist Influence on
Africans. This might be seen as an attempt to build bridges on
middle class supports, but if so, it was too small scale and
cautious a venture to have much effect on the basic imbalance
(21}between race and class.
Recently there has been some attempt to discard explanations of
the South African situation in terms of racial domination as
1
 traditional', and to assart that after all the key is to be found
( 2 2 ) ' • • • • " . - .
in class conflict. ' In some measure this tendency reflects thg
aim of demonstrating anew., the relevance of Marxist categories of
explanation, particularly the class struggle. In Its simplified
form the argument posits a rough identity between race and class.
In industrialised South Africa the majority of Africans (including
farm labourers and migratory workers), Indians and Coloursda are
seen .as having become members of the working class. This in turn
is regarded as being made up almost exclusively of non-whites. In
view of their privileged position,the unite workers are included
in the single white ruling class. This again includes all the
other elements: 'capitalists' of every description (captains of
mining, industry and commerce), farmers and landowners, the
enterprises of 'state capitalism* and finally, the proponents of
Afrikaner nationalism.
The South African state since Union is viewed as having served as
an instrument of class rule, proffering subsidies to farmers and
favours to industrialists while dispensing to the working class
(including originally white as well as black workers) disabilities
and ultimately repression. In terms of this sort of reasoning,
racial ideology is regarded as part of the capitalist systee"
itself, at least at a certain historical stage. It may be noted
in-passing that this view links up with those predictive analyses
that attack the notion that economic growth is capable of under-
mining apartheid* Instead the contrary assertion Is made that
(23)
'capitalism' thrives on apartheid.v '
Clearly/...
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Clearly the line of argument outlined above is of little value . • ;
as a technique of historical explanation. The Identity suggested
betueen class and race is simplisticf tautologous and question-
bagging: in the end one Is thrown back on race enyuay• Similarly
the vieu of race as characteristic of a certain stage of
capitalism rests on mere assertion and fails to take the task of
explanation any further. A more sophisticated argument (that of
the sociologist Adam) suggests that 'racialism la an expression
of specific interests', in the sense that it must have a socio-
economic base.* ' It is obviously wise to be alert to the
possibility of such a connection, but the implication must be
resisted that it will aluays be found, or that where It is found
it tells the uhole story. Racialism can often be shown to have
roots in a historical situation that has itself disappeared, as In
tti.e case of a slave-owning society, or to incorporate an
irrational component as demonstrated by aoclal psychologists,
A.s every schoolboy knows, from having to analyse franch society
on the eve of the Revolution, class la a familiar category in
historical enquiry* The same is true of race* Awareness of the
importance of race need not involve the historian in lengthy debate
about its validity as a scientific concept or about the nature
and limits of racial differences. But ha must concern himself
with the manifestations of race consciousness In the past, whether
in the policies and practices of governments, or in the actions
and attitudes of men, either as individuals or aa typifying certain
groups. In the case of recent South African history, valuable
Insights may be drawn from a consideration of both claaa and
racial aspects. But the attempts to explain the racial aspects in
terms of class are not convincing* The affinities of claaa
operating across the colour line seem too weak. Us alwaya return
to race as the determinant of the character of our society.
There has not been a great deal of work done by historians in the
area suggested by the title of this paper. The problems have been
discussed chiefly in the works of sociologists and economists.
It is certain that no single conceptual scheme derived from theae
disciplines could do justice to the complexities of the hietorical
process,
I / ...
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I conclude with an example to illustrate these complexities.
The historian would naturally be auspicious of any attempt to
explain the course of conflict and division within the white
community in terms of the other dimension, that of relations
between black and white. In other words, he would question any
ass'ertion that the conflict between Afrikaner nationalists
pursuing the republican goal and the defenders of the British
connection had only a symbolic importance: the advocacy of two
ideal systems for the pursuit of white interests and the desired
,; exploitation of black* In fact the conflict between Afrikaner
':: -nationalism and its white opponents, having independent origins
and an intrinsic importance, has been superimposed on a quite
,. different set of issues - those arising from the challenge of
the plural society. ' •..'.-
' As a result there has grown up the myth of the priorities, which
-Vr argues that no solution to black-white questions was possible
- - before the whites had resolved the fundamental differences among
: >
 themselves. The priorities were mistaken and did not work out
/ in practice because the nettle of race relations had anyway to
be grasped at once. Jt has been in a context of continuing white
• - . ' * • ' * ' • • . - * . - . • • •
division that the fumbling responses of the ruling race to thit
challenge have been made, lie should not think of 'a debate among
.the whites about what to do about the blacks* as having replaced an
earlier 'debate among Afrikaners about what to do about the British',
;•" . vTOfe two debates have been going on side by side all the time and
this is also true of the period sines 1948.
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